By admin 
In the House of Representatives elections on October 27, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner Komeito suffered a major defeat. The result is that the LDP government, which has been in power since the Abe administration took office in late 2012, is teetering. Under these circumstances, the media in several countries have expressed concerns about Japan’s future foreign and security policy.
In reality, there is little chance of a major change in the baseline of Japanese foreign and security policy. That said, differences in each party’s positions can be seen in specific areas.
The fact that the ruling coalition lost more than 70 seats in the elections means that a change of government is expected, but this will not be easy. After the elections for the House of Representatives, the LDP lost a large number of seats, but still remains the largest party. Meanwhile, the various opposition parties – including the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), Nippon Ishin no Kai and the People’s Democratic Party – do not have common policies, and it will be difficult for them to work together in appointing a prime minister.
Article 54 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that after the election of the House of Representatives, a special parliamentary session must be convened within 30 days to elect the prime minister. Normally, this session would be convened approximately ten days after the date of the vote. However, as the major parties need time to work out their strategy, the special Diet session is expected to take place later than the initially planned date of November 7.
Until the special parliamentary session is convened, the LDP, the largest party with 191 seats, and the CDP, which became the second-largest party with 148 seats, will likely work to secure the 233 members needed to form a to form a majority in the Japanese lower house. . As a result, it is still unclear who will become Prime Minister and what form the coalition government will take.
Yet the chance of major changes in foreign and security policy is small. Japan has for years maintained the Japan-US alliance, which still forms the basis of Japan’s foreign policy. Although some parties, such as the Communist Party and the Reiwa Shinsengumi, will call for major changes along these lines, the majority of parties share this emphasis on the American alliance. For this reason, there is little chance that this basic approach will be substantially revised, regardless of the composition of Japan’s next government.
However, this does not mean that all foreign and security policies will remain unchanged. There will likely be some revisions.
Since the Abe administration, Japan has strengthened the Japan-US alliance and its own defense system, including by changing the interpretation of the constitution regarding the right to collective self-defense and introducing peace and security legislation. The Kishida government, which succeeded the Abe government, also followed the line of Abe diplomacy.
The CDP, the People’s Democratic Party and Nippon Ishin no Kai, which are expected to have strong influence in the upcoming House of Representatives, also announced that they will continue the current policy of strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities and upholding Japan’s defense will continue. -American alliance.
On the other hand, each of these parties is opposed to following the Abe administration’s diplomacy in certain areas. For example, in terms of maintaining the Japan-US alliance, it is expected that the opposition parties will try to reduce the burden on Japan, for example by revising the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement.
Moreover, while all major parties agree that Japan’s defense capabilities need to be strengthened, there are many voices against raising taxes as a means of doing so. The opposition parties are against measures that will increase the burden on the people, such as increasing taxes. So it will be difficult to make progress in strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities without taking that into account.
The recent House of Representatives elections may have been the beginning of the end for Abe diplomacy. Ironically, however, it was the LDP itself that initiated such a change. In the LDP presidential elections in September, Ishiba Shigeru became the LDP president and then Japanese prime minister. Ishiba has advocated policies that differ from the late Abe’s foreign policy vision, such as the creation of a Asian version of NATO and a revision of the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement. In light of Ishiba’s arguments, it must be said that the policies of the opposition parties are actually more in line with Abe’s approach. In this sense, the continuation of Abe diplomacy will be difficult, whatever form the government takes in the future.
The US presidential election will take place at a time when the political situation in Japan is becoming unstable. Regardless of the outcome of the US elections, Washington will likely continue to pursue a foreign policy that prioritizes its own national interests. In addition, there may be times when Japan is asked to shoulder a greater share of the burden. It is currently unclear what action Japan will take in response.
Although Japan is unlikely to scrap the Japan-US alliance or revise the alliance relationship, there is a good possibility that it will revise its existing policies such as the Status of Forces Agreement and other details of defense cooperation.
However, it will be difficult to change the fundamental basis of Japan’s diplomacy, namely maintaining the Japan-US alliance and strengthening defense capabilities, in the current security environment where China is a threat. The relationship between Japan and the US may be problematic, but it is unlikely to fail. How to manage the Japan-US alliance will be homework for the two countries once their new governments are formed and in power.